Place-Based Policies and Spatial Disparities across European Cities. by v. Ehrlich, Maximilian & Overman, Henry G.
   
Tel. +41 031 631 37 11 
info@cred.unibe.ch 
www.cred.unibe.ch 
CRED 
Universität Bern 
Schanzeneckstrasse 1 
Postfach 
CH-3001 Bern 
 
 
 
 
 
Place-Based Policies and Spatial Disparities across  
European Cities 
 
CRED Research Paper No. 27 
 
 
Maximilian v. Ehrlich 
University of Bern,  
CRED 
Henry G. Overman 
London School of Economics, 
LSE  
 
 
 
July, 2020 
Abstract 
Spatial disparities in income levels and worklessness in the European Union are 
profound, persistent and may be widening. We describe disparities across 
metropolitan regions and discuss theories and empirical evidence that help us 
understand what causes these disparities. Increases in the productivity benefits of 
cities, the clustering of highly educated workers and increases in their wage 
premium all play a role. Europe has a long-standing tradition of using capital 
subsidies, enterprise zones, transport investments and other place-based policies to 
address these disparities. The evidence suggests these policies may have partially 
offset increasing disparities but are not sufficient to fully offset the economic forces 
at work. 
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Spatial disparities in income and worklessness across areas of the European Union are profound and 
persistent. Concerns about these disparities, and the appropriate policy response, are longstanding. 
Two trends have re-energized popular and academic debate. One is economic: on some dimensions, 
disparities have stopped narrowing and started to grow. The other is political: some argue that 
persistent disparities cause discontent and help explain the rise in populist movements (Rodriguez-
Pose 2018).  
We focus on disparities in income and worklessness across EU metropolitan regions, commonly 
called “metros,” using new definitions from OECD and Eurostat. As these metros account for around 
two-thirds of population, and larger and growing shares of employment and GDP, their economic 
performance is crucial for understanding EU disparities. Focusing on them also narrows down the 
area-based policies that are relevant. It means we have less to say about rural-urban disparities 
which involve different economic mechanisms and policies. 
Our metro definition is based on the so-called NUTS3 regions, which divide up Europe into areas of 
150,000 to 800,000 people. Our data combines these areas into metro regions: groups of NUTS3 
sharing a common labour market and meeting a minimum size threshold. We focus mostly on the 
“EU-15”, which is the group of 15 countries in the EU at the end of 2003, before the EU expanded to 
central and eastern Europe. We also offer some comparisons to the “EU-28”, referring to the total 
number of EU countries before the departure of the UK, and to the US economy.  
We begin by providing evidence that differences in GDP per capita across EU-15 metros converged in 
the 1980s, stabilized in the 1990s and early 2000s and have been diverging since the mid-2000s. We 
also show diverging patterns of worklessness.  
We then turn to research in urban economics for a theories and empirical evidence that help explain 
the factors driving these disparities. We will show that bigger cities pay higher wages (the ‘urban 
wage premium’) because they make workers more productive. They also tend to attract more 
educated workers who are more productive and earn more.  As a result, GDP per capita is higher in 
bigger cities. These two factors reinforce one another, because the urban wage premium increases 
with education. Both factors play a role in the EU in explaining the level and evolution of spatial 
disparities. We provide evidence that real estate costs increase with city size, with implications for 
real wage inequalities and whether area-level improvements in productivity capitalize into higher 
house prices. We also explore low mobility rates in Europe, and differences in labour market 
regulations, which help explain why employment disparities are more pronounced than for income.  
Do these profound spatial disparities justify place-based policies aimed at reducing them (Austin et 
al 2018)? Neumark and Simpson (2015) provide a useful overview of the literature on place-based 
policies. We focus on several policies which directly target spatial differences. Our emphasis is on 
policies that work at broad spatial scales. We argue that it is important to differentiate between 
policies as they operate via different mechanisms and yield different trade-offs between spatial 
inequality and aggregate efficiency. 
We start with EU cohesion policy. These convergence transfers appear to have fostered growth in 
supported areas and thus reduced income disparities, but the effects vary considerably across areas 
with the positive effects driven by areas with high human capital and high-quality local government. 
The evidence also finds decreasing returns from transfers. The changes in disparities over time 
suggest that the economic forces swamp the impact of EU policy. We then consider two major items 
of expenditure within total cohesion policy spending: transport and support for firms from capital 
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subsidies. Finally, we consider enterprise zones and local employment multipliers for different kinds 
of private and public sector employment.  
Europe has a long tradition of using place-based policies to support lagging regions and to address 
local downward spirals following structural change. While place-based policies did not prevent 
increasing disparities in Europe, they may have modestly mitigated them.  
 
The Evolution of Spatial Disparities across European Cities 
A comprehensive literature discusses regional disparities in Europe. Much of this uses data on 
“NUTS2 regions” of 800,000 to 3 million inhabitants which also determine eligibility for the main EU 
structural funds. In contrast, we use data on metro regions. As argued above, one reason for this is 
the economic importance of these metros, and their role in driving EU spatial disparities. 
The other reasons for using metros are analytical, but important. The economic literature on spatial 
disparities emphasizes the need to think about the appropriate spatial unit. For example, functional 
urban areas tied together by flows of people and goods should be used to think about local labour 
markets. But, for many EU countries, NUTS2 regions do not approximate functional urban areas. For 
example, London is split into five NUTS2 regions and merging just these regions—so that the London 
metro is a single geographic unit—changes one commonly used measure of dispersion across the 
EU-15 by 29 percent. Moreover, NUTS2 cover disparate areas: comparing London, Paris, and 
Munich, with the agricultural areas of Ireland, the beaches of Andalusia and the mountains of Tyrol. 
The economic theories that explain disparities across cities, countryside, beaches, and mountains 
are broad. Such breadth also widens the relevant place-based policies. 
For these economic and analytical reasons, we focus on spatial disparities across metropolitan 
regions (‘metros’) using the recent EC/OECD specification (OECD 2019).1 As described in the 
introduction, our data defines metros using NUTS3, or aggregates of NUTS3. For the EU-15 in 2015 
(the latest date for which there is data), there are 226 metros with a minimum population of 
250,000 and a maximum of 13.9 million. For the broader EU-28, we have 279 metros. In 2015, 
metros account for 64 percent of the population in the EU15 (60 percent for the EU-28), and a 
higher share of employment and GDP.  
One important headline indicator of disparities, because it determines eligibility for the main EU 
Cohesion Policy funds (discussed in detail later), is whether a NUTS2 region has GDP per capita less 
than 75 percent of the EU average. Applying this indicator to EU-15 metros, 32 of 226 metros, home 
to 12.5 percent of the metro population, are below 75 percent of the average GDP per capita. For 
the EU-28, the corresponding figures are 51 out of 279 metros and 14 percent. In the US, a similar 
proportion of metro areas (70 out of 384; as defined by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis) have 
per capita GDP that is 75 percent or less of the national average but account for only 7 percent of 
the metro population. In the EU, people are much more likely to live in poorer metros than in the 
US. This hints at the role mobility plays in understanding EU disparities. 
The coefficient of variation— the standard deviation divided by the mean—is a standard measure of 
dispersion. Figure 1 plots the (unweighted) coefficients of variation of GDP per capita across EU-15, 
EU-28 and US metros over the last four decades. In 2015, the coefficient of variation was 0.28 for the 
                                                          
1 The online Appendix provides information on data sources, descriptive statistics and additional figures. It also 
provides a more detailed discussion of disparities across NUTS2 regions. 
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EU-15, 0.33 for the EU-28. EU disparities appear to be higher than US, although the coefficients of 
variation are not directly comparable: for the US we used income (not GDP) per capita and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) metros, rather than the OECD definition. We experimented with using BEA 
data, weighted by area shares, to approximate the OECD metro definition. However, the 
approximation is imprecise, so we focus on comparing trends rather than levels. The appendix 
provides a figure using comparable OECD metro area definitions applied to the US (for a shorter time 
period), which shows that the coefficient of variation for the EU15 metros is 15% larger than for the 
US (see Figure A1).  These differences are bigger if we include non-metro areas as the least 
productive rural areas in the EU are less productive (relative to the EU mean) than the least 
productive rural areas in the US (relative to the US mean). 
Figure 1  
Coefficient of Variation of GDP per capita – EU15, EU28 and US Metros 
 
Source: Authors 
Notes: Calculations based on Eurostat and BEA data and metro definitions as described in the text. EU15 and 
EU28 calculations use GDP per capita; US uses income per capita. 
 
Variation across EU-15 and EU-28 countries explains around half the coefficient of variation for 
metro areas —44 percent and 50 percent, respectively (based on decomposing the squared 
coefficient of variation). EU-15 disparities fell in the 1980s, stabilised in the 1990s, fell again in the 
early 2000s, then increased from the mid-2000s and markedly after the double dip recession. For the 
EU-28 the coefficient of variation fell somewhat when new members joined and then remained at 
similar levels until 2015.  
Disparities in income per capita across US metros started widening around 1995, roughly a decade 
before the EU-15. But since about 2004, the trends are relatively similar. From their lowest value in 
2004, EU-15 disparities have increased by 18 percent, compared with 12 percent in the US over the 
same period). For the EU28, we observe a much higher level of disparities, but the short time series 
makes it hard to assess the longer run trend, which is why our focus is on the EU-15. 
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This rise in inequality across metros is especially striking because it follows a longer period of 
convergence across European regions in per capita income. Rosés and Wolf (2019) provide estimates 
of regional GDP per capita for a mixture of NUTS 1 and 2 regions (excluding Greece), and show a 31 
percent decrease in the coefficient of variation between 1950 and 1980.  
Another measure of convergence focuses on whether on average poor metros grow faster than rich 
metros by regressing growth rates of GDP per capita on initial levels, where the regression 
coefficient measures the extent to which regions are moving toward the mean level of per capita 
income (often referred to as beta-convergence.) Running such regressions for 1980-2015 or for 
1990-2015, we find evidence of significant mean-reversion, but for 2005-2015, we find divergence 
instead (see Figure A2). Such findings reinforce the message that a longer-term pattern of mean-
reversion of per capita income across the EU-15 has stalled and even reversed itself. This is similar to 
results for US states (Ganong and Shoag 2017) although mean-reversion ended around 15 years 
before it did in the EU. 
Figure 2  
Coefficient of variation of worklessness – EU Metros  
 
Source: Authors 
Notes: Metro definitions as defined in the text. 
Other measures of economic performance show similar patterns. The rates of employment and 
worklessness (that is, of not working in the working age population) also vary substantially. As 
shown in Figure 2, for EU-15 metros, the coefficient of variation of worklessness increased from 0.31 
in 2000 to 0.41 in 2015. Over the same period the level and trend are similar for the EU-28.2 This 
variation in worklessness has been of long-standing interest in Europe and is receiving increased 
attention in the US. For example, Austin et al. (2018) show that US disparities in worklessness rates 
are pronounced and have increased in the last decade.  
                                                          
2 For the EU-28 there is a longer time series of data on worklessness than there was for GDP per-capita so we 
can look at the evolution over the same time-period as for the EU-15. Regressing the rate of worklessness in 
2015 on the rate in 2005 gives a slope of 1.19 for EU-15 metros, suggesting that, as for GDP per capita, the 
recent past has seen divergence of worklessness. The same regression gives a coefficient of 1.07 for the EU-28. 
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Disparities in EU worklessness rates are more pronounced than those for GDP per-capita: the 
coefficient of variation for per-capita GDP in 2015 is 0.28 and for worklessness 0.41. As with GDP per 
capita, variation in per country worklessness explain around half the total variation (51 percent).  
 
What Causes Geographical Disparities in Europe? 
EU metros exhibit wide and persistent disparities in GDP per capita and in worklessness, and these 
disparities appear to be widening. To understand these disparities, the standard approach in urban 
economics is to think about firms and workers trading off productivity advantages of different cities 
against the costs of locating in those cities. (Urban amenities may play a role, too, but we sidestep 
that issue.)  
Figure 3  
Agglomeration and Urban Costs – EU metros 
 
Panel a) Agglomeration elasticity             Panel b) Urban cost elasticity 
Source: Authors. 
Note: City size is number of workers in panel (a) and population in panel (b). For panel (a) given variations in 
worklessness, we use GDP per worker and number of workers, rather than GDP per capita and population. 
Panel (b) uses data for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and includes country fixed effects to account 
for differences in real estate price indices. Deviations in the log real estate index from the country mean are on 
the y-axis, deviations in log populations from the country mean are on the x-axis. Panel (a) uses data from 
2015, panel (b) from 2011 (Italy has no 2015 data). Results are robust to using 2015 and excluding Italy. For 
details, see the online Appendix. 
 
 
Metro Disparities in Productivity and Land Prices 
A substantial literature suggests urban size is an important source both of productivity advantages 
and of higher congestion and land costs. As an illustration, Figure 3 shows that city size is positively 
associated with GDP per worker and real estate prices. For 2015, regressing the log of GDP per 
worker on the log of city size gives an elasticity —the slope of the line in the figure — of 0.077. For 
the real estate index in 2011, the elasticity is 0.930.3  
Because of the considerable wage premium earned by “college educated” the relationship of GDP 
per capita with city size overstates productivity benefits if workers sort across cities so higher 
                                                          
3 This second elasticity looks low compared to country-level estimates reported in Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani 
(2019). This is not surprising given that we pool together quite different data. 
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educated live in bigger more productive cities (as argued in Combes et al. 2008). We see such sorting 
in our data: Regressing metro GDP per worker on the share of population with tertiary education 
and absorbing country fixed effects gives a coefficient of 0.015 (i.e. a 1 percentage point increase in 
the share educated increases GDP per worker by 1.5 percent).4 Individual country-level studies 
control for such sorting on both observed characteristics (e.g. share college educated) and 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. share high ability) using individual panel data—that is, following 
specific workers over time. Unfortunately, no such panel data is available for the EU-15. However, if 
we re-estimate the relationship between GPD per capita and city size controlling for the share 
tertiary educated,  the elasticity falls from 0.077 to 0.069.  
Sorting and city size reinforce one another because more educated people live in more productive 
cities. Using US data, Moretti (2013) shows that the college wage premium is larger in big cities, a 
result we can replicate using less detailed individual level data from the EU. 5 The assortative 
matching of firms and workers may partially explain this effect (for discussion, see Card et al. 2013; 
Dauth et al. 2019).  
Explaining the Changes in Disparities over Time? 
If variations in city size and in the composition of educated workers help explain disparities across 
EU-15 metros, can a simple urban model also explain the changes over time?  
Table 1 suggests a partial answer by looking at how the estimated elasticity of GDP per worker 
changes over time with respect to metro size. As convergence slowed, and then reversed the size-
elasticity increased markedly. In column 2, we control for sorting using the share of population with 
a tertiary education, in periods when we have data. This has a relatively small effect on the 
agglomeration elasticities, although the effect does seem to be increasing over time. It is difficult to 
be precise because of the measurement error introduced by the way we must calculate tertiary 
education shares (see footnote 6). 
  
                                                          
4 Tertiary education data is only available from 2000 onwards for NUTS2. We compute the shares for metros 
by assigning each NUTS3 the corresponding NUTS2 education shares. For 14 metros, which only have data 
from 2005 on, we impute shares using a model with metro fixed effects and a linear time trend. 
5 Using data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC), we run Mincer-style regressions 
including a city residence indicator interacted with a tertiary education indicator. The positive coefficient on 
the interaction suggests a higher tertiary education premium in cities (see Table A3). Grujovic (2019) provides 
similar evidence with German data. Regressions using the EU SILC data show the high-skilled are 9.5 percent 
more likely to live in a city than the average and the effect has been increasing somewhat since the start of the 
data in 2005 (see Table A4). 
8 
 
Table 1  
Agglomeration elasticity: EU-15 Metros 
 
Year Agglomeration elasticity  Agglomeration elasticity 
conditional tertiary education 
share 
1980 0.0429 (0.0260) . 
1990 0.0517 (0.0175) . 
2000 0.0778 (0.0136) 0.0764 (0.0135) 
2010 0.0835 (0.0122) 0.0791 (0.0123) 
2015 0.0774 (0.0132) 0.0686 (0.0134) 
Source: Authors 
Note: Coefficients from regression of log GDP per worker on log number of workers controlling for share 
tertiary educated (column 2). Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
We can look more directly at sorting by considering changes in the “college educated” wage 
premium and in the spatial concentration of skilled workers. For some EU countries, the university 
graduate premium has increased (Machin and van Reenen 2007; Dustmann et al. 2009) which 
directly increases disparities between smaller and bigger cities as the latter employ more highly 
educated workers.  
Changes in the spatial concentration of highly educated workers reinforce the increase in the 
“college educated” wage premium. In EU-15 metros, the share of population with a tertiary 
education increased by about 10 percentage points between 2000 and 2015. This increase was not 
equally distributed across metros. Regressing the log growth of tertiary education shares on the log 
of initial population and including country fixed effects shows that a 10 percent increase in initial 
metro population is associated with a rise of 13.6 percent in the share tertiary educated over the 
period (see Figure A3). That is, we see increased sorting of the more educated population consistent 
with US evidence (Moretti, 2004 and Berry and Glaeser, 2005). This increasing concentration of 
more educated workers is reflected in increased concentration of skill-intensive employment. For 
example, using patents as a proxy for skill-intensive employment, we see increased spatial 
concentration between the early 1990s and early 2010s (see Figure A4).   
What explains the increasing concentration of more educated workers in big cities? One factor is the 
shift from manufacturing to knowledge-intensive services: the employment share of knowledge 
intensive services and high technology manufacturing increased in the EU from 2000-15 by around. 
16 percent. This shift was caused by a mixture of increased globalisation (like the “China shock,” as 
in Autor et al., 2013; Dauth and Suedekum, 2016) and technological change and increased 
automation (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019; Dauth et al. 2019). As knowledge-intensive services 
employ more educated workers and benefit from higher agglomeration economies this structural 
shift should see increased concentration of more educated workers in big cities.  
An inelastic supply of housing in growing and more productive metros also plays a role. High house 
prices prevent the poor, who spend a higher income share on housing, from moving to more 
productive areas (Ganong and Shoag 2017). In some EU metros, land use constraints are highly 
restrictive and increase house prices (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). For the EU countries in our data, 
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real estate price increases are particularly pronounced in places with high initial GDP per worker (see 
Figure A5). For the US, Hsieh and Moretti (2019), estimate the aggregate GDP costs of the spatial 
misallocation resulting from such land use constraints, but no estimates are available for the EU. 
Spatial Disparities in Worklessness 
As is well known, differences in labour market institutions play an important role in explaining 
country variation in worklessness (in this journal, Siebert 1997). These institutions may also help 
explain why spatial disparities in worklessness are more pronounced. For example, nationally set 
minimum wages could increase worklessness in poorer areas: evidence for Germany suggests this 
happens in some low wage areas (Ahlfeldt et al 2019). Even without binding minimum wages 
centralised wage bargaining may be a driver of spatial disparities in worklessness as such schemes 
prevent the adjustment of wages to regional productivity differences. Comparing Italy and Germany, 
Boeri et al. (2019) argue that centralized wage bargaining in Italy translates similar spatial variations 
in productivity into much smaller variation in nominal wages, but much bigger variations in 
worklessness. Our results confirm the important role of labour market institutions: regressing metro 
worklessness rates against GDP per worker, we find a negative coefficient which is more than twice 
as large for countries with more centralized wage bargaining.6  
Mobility and Spatial Disparities 
According to Molloy et al. (in this journal, 2011) mobility in 2005 was significantly higher in the US 
than in the EU, which contributed to higher EU disparities. In contrast to the US where mobility rates 
have been falling, the EU trend is less clear and mobility may have been increasing (EU Commission 
2018). Fischer and Pfaffermayr (2018) suggests that labour mobility plays a small role in reducing EU 
disparities in per-capita GDP. Unfortunately, this increased mobility took place against a background 
of increasing concentration of economic activity and sorting of high skilled towards big cities. There 
is also some evidence that regional transfers may slow down the adjustment that occurs via mobility 
(Egger et al. 2014; Jofre-Monseny 2014).   
 
Place-based policies 
So far, we considered factors that explain disparities across EU metros and why these areas have 
stopped converging and started to diverge. The rest of the paper considers place-based policies. We 
consider policies that explicitly target the spatial allocation of economic activity. We will not discuss 
general national-level policies like schools funding, employment training, and others that directly 
target outcomes like education that matter for spatial disparities, but aren’t necessarily designed to 
target the issue of divergence. We focus on what we know about the impact of these policies on 
specific economic outcomes such as employment and how this depends on the economic forces 
driving spatial disparities that we discussed above. 
These forces also affect the equity and efficiency of place-based policies. In distributional terms, the 
effect of policy will be partly determined by the mobility of individuals living in the area targeted and 
the housing supply elasticity (Kline and Moretti 2014). For example, with relatively elastic supply of 
labour across metros, but an inelastic housing supply, local benefits of spatial transfers are realized 
                                                          
6 Conditional on country fixed effects the effect of log GDP per worker on non-employment rates is -0.21 in the 
group of countries with more flexible regional wage bargaining (AT, DE, DK, NL, SE), -0.57 in the group with less 
flexible, more centralized wage bargaining (BE, FI, FR, IT, PT, SI) Both coefficients are significant at the 1 
percent level. 
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by landlords as they capitalize into land prices. Firm and household mobility also increases the risk 
that if policy induces significant local employment effects in targeted areas, these may come at the 
cost of employment losses elsewhere. Displacement from richer to poorer metro areas will 
presumably narrow disparities. The effect on overall output depends on whether agglomeration 
economies in targeted areas outweigh potential losses in non-targeted areas. Shifting investments 
and jobs from prosperous, productive areas to lagging, less productive regions is likely to generate 
aggregate efficiency costs. The effect of displacement on aggregate welfare depends on equity 
considerations and also how it affects congestion externalities: for example, if displacement from 
richer to poorer cities reduces both congestion and agglomeration externalities, the net effect might 
decrease productivity, but increase welfare (for example, Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020; Henkel et 
al. 2018). It is unlikely that policy-makers have enough information to account for this potential 
mixture of externalities (Kline and Moretti, 2014).  
EU Cohesion Policy 
Reducing spatial disparities in income and worklessness is a long-standing EU objective. 
Interventions directly funded by the EU include investments in transport infrastructure and in local 
public goods and services, a mix of firm subsidies and human capital investments including 
employment training. There are three main funds: The European Social Fund, the European Regional 
Development Fund, and the Cohesion Fund. Other smaller funds also partly target less developed 
regions.  
The cohesion policy budget for 2014-2020 is €645 billion (for a detailed description, see 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/). Total expenditure is around one-third of the EU budget, which 
is small relative to total government expenditure. That said, the impact of EU policy is greater than 
this suggests, because EU state aid rules restrict policy in member states. The lion’s share of the 
budget (60 percent) goes towards ‘less-developed’ regions, with GDP per capita less than 75 percent 
of the EU average. Investments in transport infrastructure, research and development, and business 
support are the main expenditure categories accounting for 45-50 percent of the budget.  
Various arguments are used to justify EU cohesion policies. One approach takes equity arguments 
used to justify policies to reduce disparities within nation-states and extends these to an EU-wide 
policy. For example, if all EU citizens should be entitled to similar public goods, EU policy may be 
justified as helping to equalize fiscal capacity.  
From an efficiency perspective, cohesion policy could lead to higher aggregate output if there are 
diminishing returns to public investment, so that investing in areas with lower levels of public 
investment will produce larger gains. Or the EU might play a federal role coordinating investments 
that exert cross-area externalities. Or EU transfers may mitigate externalities from fiscal competition 
among jurisdictions. 
An alternative argument makes the case for cohesion policies as a tool for advancing European 
integration. For example, transfers may build acceptance of the EU in new member states. This may 
be important if integration generates economic growth at the centre at the expense of peripheral 
regions (Puga 2002) or if wealthier areas can set higher taxes because firms’ desire to locate there 
reduces tax competition (Brülhart et al. 2012).  
The effects of EU cohesion policies have been studied extensively. Clear eligibility criteria, strictly 
applied and largely unchanged since 1989, allow for a (quasi-)experimental situation in which NUTS2 
regions with GDP per capita slightly below the 75 percent threshold receive substantial transfers and 
can be compared to regions slightly above the threshold that do not. Becker et al. (2010) use this 
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threshold to identify the effect of transfers using a regression discontinuity design. On average, 
transfers appear to have been effective in fostering growth in recipients and thus reducing 
disparities (Becker et al. 2010, Mohl and Hagen 2010, Pellegrini et al, 2013, Giua 2017).  
However, the effects vary considerably across areas depending on local conditions. The positive 
effects are driven by regions with high human capital, as measured by education of the workforce, 
and high-quality local government, as measured by survey data about public services (Becker et al. 
2013). Transfers are ineffective elsewhere. One potential reason is that while member states agree 
strategy and budgets, selection of projects is done by regional authorities. Lower-quality local 
governments may choose ineffective policy. Or worse, may be more susceptible to increased rent-
seeking activities and white-collar crime (Accetturo et al. 2014; de Angelis et al. 2018). 
The empirical evidence also suggests decreasing returns from cohesion transfers. Becker et al (2012) 
and Cerqua and Pellegrini (2018) estimate the effects of transfer intensity (defined as transfers 
relative to local GDP). Their results imply that the marginal treatment effect declines with higher 
intensity and becomes zero at some “maximum desirable treatment intensity.” One explanation is 
that limits to institutional capacity mean that additional subsidies are used with increasing 
inefficiency. Alternatively, the returns to investment may decrease in a way consistent with a 
neoclassical aggregate production function so even high-quality governments see decreasing 
returns. The literature does not discriminate between these two explanations. 
Finally, a key question is whether transfers lead to a temporary or permanent improvements. The 
evidence is inconclusive, but raises doubts that effects are long-lived. For example, case studies of 
the Italian Abruzzi region and the UK’s South Yorkshire region, which lost eligibility in 1996 and 2006 
(respectively) suggest improvements were temporary (Barone et al. 2016; Di Cataldo 2017). Becker 
et al. (2018) look at all areas which lost eligibility, finding on average reversion to pre-transfer 
trajectories once funds are cut.  
The findings raise several questions about ways to improve cohesion policy. For example, should the 
EU allow for a longer transition period when areas become ineligible for subsidies? Are transfers 
well-targeted at investments that improve long-run growth? Given the importance of human capital 
to the effectiveness of subsidies —both directly in labour markets and indirectly through improving 
local institutional quality—perhaps human capital should be a higher priority than, say, 
infrastructure? Similarly, given that effectiveness decreases as transfers increase, would it make 
sense to transfer some subsidies from regions with a higher ratio of subsidies to GDP to regions with 
a lower ratio?  
All the evidence is for regions rather than metros. Given the economic importance of metros and the 
difference between urban and rural economies more should be done to understand the differential 
impacts of cohesion policy. As metros are on average more highly educated, and human capital and 
GDP per capita matter for effectiveness, the efficiency of the funds may be increased by targeting 
metros that are relatively high skilled compared to surrounding regions. At the same time, the 
increased sorting of more educated workers means that declining areas, which are losing their more 
educated labour force, will also be less able to transform transfers into growth. This raises questions 
around place-based policies that target skilled labour, an issue to which we return below. 
So far, we have focused on the overall effect of EU cohesion policy considering the effects of 
transfers consisting of a bundle of interventions. Blouri and Ehrlich (2020) find that there is 
significant variation across interventions in their effects. Thus, we next consider the impact of 
different policies, drawing on cross-EU studies and papers looking at national policies.  
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Transport Infrastructure 
A substantial share of EU cohesion spending is on transport infrastructure: 18 percent in 2014-20, 
down from 25 percent in 2007-13. Nation-state infrastructure investment is many times larger. One 
way of thinking about infrastructure projects is as a public capital input that makes firms more 
productive (Aschauer, 1989). This assumes decreasing returns to infrastructure investment, 
consistent with the findings for EU cohesion policy. More recent literature has emphasised the 
importance of thinking about the transport network. Changing the network affects firm access to 
goods markets and input factors and worker access to jobs. As these determine the relative 
attractiveness of places, infrastructure may affect the location of firms and workers, shaping the 
spatial distribution of activity. For an overview of theory and empirics on the impact of transport 
infrastructure, see Redding and Turner 2015.  
Recent empirical evidence has looked at these effects using the impact of road investments. For 
example, looking at incremental changes in UK road infrastructure, Gibbons et al (2019) find 
substantial positive effects on area employment and number of establishments. While employment 
gains are largely driven by firm entry, some firm-level analysis also finds productivity increases for 
incumbent firms. Holl (2016) provides such evidence for improved highway access in Spain which 
also increased economic activity close to highways. These studies show sizable local effects but may 
not identify aggregate effects when improvements affect the entire network. 
A central aim of the EU is to increase integration by lowering transaction costs, thus potentially 
causing fundamental changes in economic geography. For example, the Trans-European Network is 
a key project that aims to improve integration. However, there are long-running debates about the 
spatial effects of infrastructure in the “New Economic Geography” research (Krugman 1991; Fujita et 
al. 1999; Puga 2001; Baldwin et al. 2003) For example, the “two-way roads” problem points out that 
transport improves the access of firms in less developed regions to core markets, but also increases 
core firms access to less-developed regions. As a result, transport investments may increase or 
decrease industrial concentration. Overall, this literature suggests that the effect on spatial 
disparities depends on several factors: the reduction in trade costs, wage differences, congestion 
costs, and mobility.  
Unfortunately, the two-region structure common in these earlier models proved hard to adapt to 
multi-region settings and complex transport networks.  
More recent spatial economic models eliminate the possibility of multiple-equilibrium but more 
easily incorporate realistic multi-region geography (Allen and Arkolakis 2014; Redding and Rossi-
Hansberg 2017). Once fitted to real world data, such models can assess the relative contribution of 
location, market access and local (perhaps innate?) productivity differences in explaining spatial 
disparities. They can also quantify the effects of changes to transport networks on the spatial 
distribution of employment, income and aggregate welfare while allowing for displacement.   
Santamaria (2019) uses this approach to quantify the welfare effects of reshaping the West German 
highways network after World War II and finds that this generated large persistent income gains. 
Allen and Arkolakis (2019) derive a framework to compute the welfare impact of local infrastructure 
improvements in the presence of agglomeration and congestion externalities. Even without 
relocation, the welfare effects spread over the network through changes in price indices. Blouri and 
Ehrlich (2020) use a similar model to consider the general equilibrium impact of EU infrastructure 
investments. Investments increase local productivity and this, combined with reduced transport 
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costs, generates significant aggregate welfare gains—but only a relatively small reduction in income 
disparities. The utility-maximizing distribution of investments suggests that funds should be 
redistributed towards more central regions and some border regions. Unfortunately, this 
redistribution is predicted to increase spatial income inequality, once again highlighting the trade-off 
between aggregate efficiency and spatial disparities.7 
Can transport infrastructure investments explain the recent divergence across metro areas? Initial 
investments in the Trans-European Networks may have mostly completed national networks, and 
the associated increase in public capital stock could have driven between-country convergence in 
the 1980s. However, if later investment did more to complete the cross-country network or were 
targeted more to core areas, the contribution to convergence would be reduced.  
Again, much of the available evidence considers regions rather than metros. These leaves questions 
about place-based policy that have not been widely addressed.  If reallocating transport expenditure 
towards more central regions maximizes aggregate efficiency, would this also hold true within 
regions? Transport investment may also interact with educational composition: for example, public 
transport in big cities may attract more educated workers, thus helping explain increased sorting. 
This has not been studied for Europe as a whole, but Fretz et al. (2019) study effects of the 
construction of the Swiss highway network, showing that improved access for municipalities led to a 
significant increase in their share of high-income households.   
Capital Subsidies and Enterprise Zones 
Governments offer subsidies to specific firms, particularly in disadvantaged areas. Such subsidies 
raise two major concerns: the “deadweight” problem that they finance activities that firms would 
have undertaken anyhow; and the “displacement” problem that if subsidies encourage new activity 
in targeted areas, this may come at the cost of activity elsewhere.  
Research seeking to understanding the deadweight and displacement effects from EU policies 
struggles with a lack of detailed data and substantial identification challenges (see e.g. Bachtrögler 
and Hammer (2018) and Beņkovskis et al. (2019).  
Country-level studies have made more progress because one (unintended) consequence of EU state 
aid rules is that they induce exogenous variation to identify the impact of place-based capital 
subsidies. Some studies suggest that subsidies, if well designed, can alter firm behavior (i.e. not all 
the impacts are deadweight). For example, Criscuolo et al. (2019) look at the impact of the UK’s 
Regional Selective Assistance scheme, which provided discretionary grants to manufacturing firms in 
disadvantaged areas. The rules governing area eligibility are determined by EU rules. Thus, changes 
in EU rules provide a source of exogenous variation for estimating the impact on employment, 
unemployment and other firm outcomes. Subsidies have large and statistically significant effects: 
increasing area level manufacturing employment and decreasing unemployment. These effects are 
driven by small firms. Similar strategies have been used for other place-based capital schemes 
including the GRW in Germany (Brachert et al. 2019; Etzel et al. 2020) and Law 488/1992 in Italy 
(Bronzini and de Blasio 2006). The results are not always positive. Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) find 
evidence of substantial deadweight and displacement: subsidized firms bring forward investment 
projects and gains may come at the expense of non-subsidized firms. 
                                                          
7 Further welfare gains can be realized by supra-national coordination of infrastructure—for example, if 
governments ignore foreign consumers when deciding on investment in border regions (Felbermayr and 
Tarassov 2019). 
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Enterprise zones, in most incarnations, offer a broader set of subsidies (not just capital subsidies), 
some of which may offer indirect support to firms (like relaxation of planning regulations), but in a 
specific area often much smaller than a metro area. Most of the literature on enterprise zones 
comes from the US (Neumark and Simpson provide a summary), but a small literature considers the 
effect of European schemes, particularly the French Franches Urbaines (for example, Briant et al. 
2013; Mayer et al. 2017; Givord et al. 2013; Gobillon et al. 2012). 
One difference that emerges is that US enterprise zones have larger impacts on area unemployment, 
which may reflect the fact that some US schemes impose “local hiring conditions,” (usually that a 
certain percentage of workers must live locally) which are not used in Europe.  
Another difference is that deadweight and displacement concerns are more pronounced for 
enterprise zones than for place-based capital subsidies operating at broader spatial scales. One 
explanation is that the latter are often selective. For example, to be eligible to receive UK Regional 
Selective Assistance, a firm must demonstrate that it does not predominantly serve local markets. 
Such a requirement may reduce displacement compared to enterprise zones that provide non-
discretionary subsidies to all firms within the zone. A second explanation is that a firm relocating to 
an enterprise zone within the same metro can access the same local labor markets and do business 
with existing customers and suppliers. In the absence of a local hiring requirement, it can even 
employ the same workers. This creates large incentives to re-locate within metros. In contrast, firms 
relocating to take advantage of other place-based capital subsidies may need to move to different 
local labour markets and face differential access to customers and suppliers.  
We have little evidence on the efficient spatial allocation of these area-based initiatives. As one 
example, Gaubert (2019) studies the location choice of heterogeneous firms when offered firm 
subsidies to locate in difference size cities. In the model (calibrated to the French ZFU programme), 
firm subsidies in small, less productive cities lead to displacement which has negative effects on 
aggregate productivity. Transfers to large, productive cities increase aggregate productivity.  
The effects of these policies on spatial disparities will be modest.  If the findings for UK Regional 
Selective Assistance generalize, selective (capital) subsidies may reduce disparities in worklessness 
but not GDP per capita. For the scale at which enterprise zones operate, and given the findings on 
displacement, it is unlikely that these have much impact on metro disparities in the EU. 
Local Employment Multipliers  
Firm-level subsidies aim to support employment at an individual firm, or to attract new employers to 
an area. This should directly increase local employment, providing that subsidised employment does 
not displace existing jobs. This increased local employment may generate additional jobs by 
increasing productivity (as in Greenstone et al. 2010) or demand for locally produced goods and 
services. These positive “multipliers” may be offset by general equilibrium effects that increase local 
wages or prices.  
The literature on local multipliers assesses the net effect on local employment. The evidence 
considers multipliers from three kinds of employment: in tradable sectors (that sell mostly outside 
the local economy); in tradable skilled and high-tech sectors; and in the public sector. The multiplier 
for jobs in tradable sectors on jobs in non-tradable sectors is the most frequently estimated. 
Estimates for Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom differ, although are broadly in line with 
US estimates. These suggest that an additional tradable job creates between 0.5 and 1.5 extra jobs 
in the non-tradable sector. A smaller number of studies provide estimates for high-tech or high-
skilled tradables, generally finding larger multipliers (again, consistent with US evidence). 
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The fact that these multipliers are higher might provide an additional justification, over and above 
the direct effect on innovation, for policies that support the clustering and collaboration of firms in 
R&D-intensive sectors. However, evidence on the effectiveness of these policies is mixed. For 
example, for Germany, Falck et al. (2010) document positive effects on innovation, whereas Martin 
et al. (2011) and Falck et al. (2019) tend to find no effects on regional employment in France and 
Germany, respectively. Moreover, these studies ignore the negative aggregate effect of spreading 
out activities that may benefit from large agglomeration economies. It also ignores the possibility 
that price effects, like higher prices of housing, may outweigh any employment effects for the lower 
skilled (Lee et al. 2018).   
Decisions about public sector employment allow governments to affect the spatial allocation of 
employment directly. For example, central government employment is usually concentrated in the 
capital city. Re-allocation of public sector employment from richer to poorer areas provides a direct 
mechanism for reducing disparities.  
Some studies estimate multiplier effects for these public sector jobs (Faggio and Overman 2014). 
The What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2019) identified six such studies. Results are 
mixed, with two finding negative effects on private sector employment (that is, crowding out), one 
finding no effect, and three finding positive multipliers. Two of these three report crowding out for 
manufacturing, offset by a positive multiplier on services. Increases in wages or house prices seem to 
underpin these crowding out effects. Overall, estimated public sector multipliers are smaller than 
private sector. One explanation is that public sector employers may have weaker input-output 
linkages with local firms. Another is that salaries are relatively high in relocated public sector jobs, 
consistent with both larger price effects on wages and housing and higher levels of crowding out.  
 
Conclusion 
EU Spatial disparities are profound, persistent and may be widening. Thinking about the role of 
metros and the sorting of workers helps better understand these disparities and the effect of 
different policies and complements the extensive literature on regional disparities. The findings that 
EU support is more effective in higher educated regions, on the intensity of transfers and the impact 
of transport raise questions about whether funds should be targeted more at metros. Regardless of 
the intervention, our understanding of many place-based policies is improved if we think about the 
effects from a metro perspective.   
Our discussion has raised several questions without answering them, and here is one more. At least 
as far back as Akerlof et al. (1991), economists have raised the possibility of employment subsidies 
to help address EU disparities and reduce the risk of “downward spirals” arising from large localized 
negative shocks. But the emphasis of EU cohesion policy has remained on infrastructure investment 
and physical capital subsidies. Perhaps the set of cohesion policy instruments needs to be 
expanded?  
Historically, arguments between proponents of place-based or place-blind policies have been 
conducted as an either-or debate.  In a world where some people are mobile, and others are not, we 
do not find this distinction helpful.  
Instead we need to understand the impacts of a range of different policies regardless of whether 
they are targeted at people or at places. The cost-effectiveness, the consequences for spatial 
disparities, and the benefits for different kinds of people living in different places, are likely to vary 
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significantly across policies. It is unlikely that a priori classifications of policy as place-based or place-
blind will be very informative about these differential impacts on redistribution and aggregate 
efficiency, and the tradeoffs between them.   
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Online Appendix: 
Data Sources 
Our main data is from Eurostat and the EU Joint Research Centre’s (EUJRC) regional database. We 
use the 2016 NUTS3 level classification. For data provided according to the 2010 or 2013 NUTS 
classification we apply the mapping provided by EUJRC to assign the corresponding 2016 NUTS3 
regions (https://urban.jrc.ec.europa.eu/nutsconverter/#/). We exclude the French overseas 
territories, the Canary Islands, the autonomous regions Ceuta and Melilla, and the autonomous 
regions Azores and Madeira. We restrict the data to the EU15 for the period 1980-2003 and cover 
the EU28 from 2004 to 2015. 
Information about real estate price indices, used to produce Figure 3b, is available for France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and England. We collect this information from several sources. Data for 
France comes from MeilleursAgents and covers Paris, top10 and top50 cities between 2007 and 
2015. The index for Germany is based on the Regional Real Estate Price Indices for Germany (RWI-
GEO-REDv1) constructed by Boelmann and Schaffner (2019) and covers real estate advertisement 
data for individual units between 2007 and 2019 which we assigned to NUTS3 regions. Information 
for Italy is obtained from the Osservatorio Mobiliare Italiano and contains transaction-level data on 
residential real estate sales in Italian provinces between 2007 and 2011; For Spain we use the Indice 
de Mercados Immobiliarios Espanoles provided by TINSA on the city level for 2001 to 2015. The data 
for English cities (we lack Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales) is based on Hilber and Mense 
(2019) covering Local Planning Authorities between 2000 and 2015. 
Information about tertiary education rates, used to produce column 2 of Table 1, is provided by 
EUJRC at NUTS2 level and we assign each NUTS3 region the education rate of the corresponding 
upper tier NUTS2 region.  
Micro level information on earnings, education and residential information, used to estimate the 
mincer regressions reported in the text, is provided by the EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions. We focus in our analysis on the cross-section for 2015 while the results are robust to 
using different years (in principle the data is available since 2004 with some differences in the 
coverage of countries).  
EU Metro Regions 
As discussed in the text, we use the recent EC/OECD specification of metropolitan regions that 
provide a consistent definition for the whole EU. Details on how these are constructed can be found 
in OECD (2019). The following text, taken from p.3 of that report, provides a short definition. 
A functional urban area can be defined in four steps: 
1. Identify an urban centre: a set of contiguous, high density (1,500 residents per square 
kilometre) grid cells with a population of 50,000 in the contiguous cells; 
2. Identify a city: one or more local units that have at least 50 percent of their residents inside 
an urban centre; 
3. Identify a commuting zone: a set of contiguous local units that have at least 15 percent of 
their employed residents working in the city; 
4. A functional urban area is the combination of the city with its commuting zone. 
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We use the version that defines metropolitan-regions (‘metros’) in terms of NUTS3 or aggregates of 
NUTS3, as appropriate. Table A1 provides a list of the metro-regions by country, while table A2 
provides basic descriptive statistics.  
Table A1:  
Metros by country 
 
AT Lübeck FI Palermo Ploieşti 
Graz Magdeburg Helsinki Parma Timisoara 
Innsbruck Mainz Tampere Prato SE 
Linz 
Mannheim-
Ludwigshafen Turku 
Reggio 
nell'Emilia Göteborg 
Salzburg Mönchengladbach FR Roma Malmö 
Wien München Amiens Taranto Stockholm 
BE Münster Angers Torino Uppsala 
Antwerpen Neubrandenburg Annecy Venezia SI 
Bruxelles / Brussel Nürnberg Besanþon Verona Ljubljana 
Charleroi Offenburg Bordeaux LT Maribor 
Gent Oldenburg  Brest Kaunas SK 
Liège Osnabrück Caen Vilnius Bratislava 
BG Paderborn Clermont-Ferrand LU Košice 
Burgas Pforzheim Dijon Luxembourg UK 
Plovdiv Regensburg Grenoble LV Aberdeen 
Sofia Reutlingen Le Mans Riga Belfast 
Varna Rosenheim 
Lille - Dunkerque - 
Valenciennes MT 
Blackburn - Blackpool - 
Preston 
CY Rostock Limoges Valletta Bournemouth 
Lefkosia Ruhrgebiet Lyon NL Bradford 
CZ Saarbrücken Marseille Amsterdam Brighton and Hove 
Brno Schweinfurt Montpellier 
Arnhem - 
Nijmegen Bristol 
Ostrava Schwerin Mulhouse Breda Cambridge 
Plzen Siegen Nancy Eindhoven Cardiff 
Praha Stuttgart Nantes Enschede 
Cheshire West and 
Chester 
DE Ulm Nice Groningen Colchester 
Aachen Wetzlar Nimes Leeuwarden Coventry 
Aschaffenburg Wiesbaden Orléans Leiden Derby 
Augsburg Wuppertal Paris Rotterdam Doncaster 
Bayreuth Würzburg Pau Tilburg Dundee 
Berlin Zwickau Perpignan Utrecht Edinburgh 
Bielefeld DK Poitiers Zwolle Exeter 
Bocholt Aalborg Reims s' Gravenhage Glasgow 
Bonn København Rennes PL Ipswich 
Braunschweig-Salzgitter-
Wolfsburg Odense Rouen - Le Havre Bialystok Kingston upon Hull 
Bremen Århus Saint-Etienne Bielsko-Biala Kirklees 
Bremerhaven EE Strasbourg 
Bydgoszcz - 
Torún Leeds 
Darmstadt Tallinn Toulouse Czestochowa Leicester 
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Dresden EL Tours Gdansk Liverpool 
Düren Athina HR Katowice London 
Düsseldorf Thessaloniki Grad Zagreb Kielce Manchester 
Erfurt ES Split Kraków Medway 
Flensburg A Coruña HU Lublin Middlesbrough 
Frankfurt am Main 
Alicante/Alacant - 
Elche/Elx Budapest Lódz Newcastle upon Tyne 
Freiburg im Breisgau Barcelona Debrecen Olsztyn Northampton 
Gießen Bilbao Miskolc Opole Norwich 
Görlitz Cádiz Pécs Poznan Nottingham 
Göttingen Córdoba Székesfehérvár Radom Oxford 
Halle an der Saale Granada IE Rzeszów Plymouth 
Hamburg Guipúzcoa Cork Szczecin Portsmouth 
Hannover Madrid Dublin Tarnów Sheffield 
Heidelberg Murcia - Cartagena IT Warszawa Southampton 
Heilbronn Málaga - Marbella Bari Wroclaw Stoke-on-Trent 
Hildesheim Oviedo - Gijón Bergamo PT Sunderland 
Ingolstadt Palma de Mallorca Bologna Coimbra Swansea 
Iserlohn Pamplona/Iruña Brescia Lisboa 
West Midlands urban 
area 
Kaiserslautern Santander Cagliari Porto  
Karlsruhe Sevilla Catania RO  
Kassel Valencia Firenze Brasov  
Kiel Valladolid Genova Bucuresti  
Koblenz Vigo Messina Cluj-Napoca  
Konstanz Vitoria/Gasteiz Milano Constanta  
Köln Zaragoza Napoli Craiova  
Leipzig  Padova Galati  
   Iasi  
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Table A2  
Summary statistics EU metros 
 Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Year 1980      
Population (1000)  215 985 1,252 205 11,206 
GDP per capita   215 7,879 2,464 2,476 19,608 
Employment (1000) 215 422 607 91 6,016 
      
Year 1990      
Population (1000)  215 1,015 1,282 212 11,254 
GDP per capita  215 16,580 4,375 8,384 30,685 
Employment (1000) 215 457 654 100 6,417 
      
Year 2000      
Population (1000)  226 1,044 1,328 226 11,932 
GDP per capita   226 23,364 5,983 11,538 48,663 
Employment (1000) 226 491 690 89 6,616 
Tertiary share (%) 212 21.4 6.5 3.3 38.5 
Worklessness share (%) 211 30.7 9.7 8.5 58.7 
      
Year 2005      
Population (1000)  279 1,042 1,270 236 12,316 
GDP per capita (1000)   279 24,522 8,197 6,254 57,328 
Employment (1000) 279 493 657 98 6,692 
Tertiary share 271 23.0 7.4 7.8 42.3 
Worklessness share 264 31.0 9.5 0.9 57.1 
      
Year 2015      
Population (1000)  279 1,088 1,366 248 13,839 
GDP per capita  279 30,182 9,839 11,210 76,152 
Employment (1000) 260 522 725 96 7,874 
Tertiary share (%) 260 30.3 8.5 11.57 52.4 
Worklessness share (%) 260 28.2 11.6 -4.3 57.3 
Notes: We summarize the data for 1980-2000 for EU15 metros and 2000-15 for EU28 metros. Until 1990 we 
lack data for 11 East-German metros. The share of tertiary education is imputed using NUTS2 level data and 
is available only since 2000. Worklessness is computed using employment data and population counts for 
the age group 15-64 which is available since 2000. We lack data on employment for metros in Lithuania and 
Poland. A negative value of workessness share applied in Luxembourg where cross border commuting is 
common. 
 
 
 
  
25 
 
Spatial Disparities in Europe: Additional Figures 
Figure A1  
Coefficient of Variation of GDP per capita – Metropolitan areas EU15, and US 
 
 
Source: Authors 
Notes: Calculations based on OECD data and the definition of OECD metro areas. 
  
Figure A2: Beta Convergence– EU15 Metro Regions 
 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations. We report the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for standard beta 
convergence regressions. For the EU28, we can only compute the beta coefficient for 2005 to 2015. Consistent 
with the CV, we observe significant beta convergence (coefficient 0.031, significant at the 1 percent level) as 
the metros of the new EU member states catch up to the EU15. 
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Figure A3  
Change in the share of population with tertiary education 2015-2000 – EU15 Metros 
 
Notes: The coefficient for the linear regression illustrated by the straight line is 1.99 (significant at the 1 
percent level). With country fixed effects the coefficient is 1.36. If we use the log of initial population with 
tertiary education instead of log of population the coefficient is 1.62 (with country fixed effects). 
 
 
Figure A4 
Change in the number of patents 2010(12)-1985(81) – EU15 Metros 
 
Notes: The straight line represents the 45-degree line.  
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Figure A5  
Change in real estate price index and initial productivity – EU15 Metro areas 
 
Notes: The coefficient for the linear regression illustrated by the straight line is 0.025 (significant at the 1 
percent level). The scatter plot and the regression are conditional on country fixed effects. We use the period 
2005-2015. For Italy we only have data until 2011. 
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Evidence on Agglomeration Economies 
Table A3: Micro level evidence on agglomeration economies – EU15 in 2015 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log income Log income Log income 
        
Log age 4.633*** 3.724*** 3.726*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0677) (0.0677) 
Log age ^2 -0.611*** -0.473*** -0.473*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Female -0.188*** -0.230*** -0.230*** 
 (0.00442) (0.00424) (0.00424) 
City 0.115*** 0.0646*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.00489) (0.00469) (0.00617) 
Tertiary Education 
 
0.397*** 0.388*** 
  (0.00436) (0.00531) 
Tertiary Education x City 
 
 0.0260*** 
 
  (0.00887) 
Constant 1.677*** 3.014*** 3.013*** 
 (0.114) (0.109) (0.109) 
Observations 
81,349 81,349 81,349 
R-squared 0.395 0.451 0.451 
 
Notes: City is unity if the individual lives in a high-density area according to Eurostat’s Degree of urbanisation 
(DEGURBA) classification. Tertiary is unity if the individual has completed the first stage of tertiary education 
(not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) or the second stage of tertiary education (leading 
to an advanced research qualification). We drop self-employed and family workers. Standard errors in 
parentheses; all specifications include country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A4: Micro level evidence on sorting by education – EU15 in 2015 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES City City City 
 Linear models Logit 
        
Tertiary Education 0.0942*** 0.107*** 0.0913*** 
 (0.00200) (0.00192) (0.00195) 
Log age -0.0292* -0.00830 -0.0274* 
 (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0154) 
Log age ^2 -0.000394 -0.00328 -0.000701 
 (0.00236) (0.00223) (0.00236) 
Constant 0.387*** 0.347***  
 (0.0244) (0.0231)  
    
Observations 275,585 275,585 275,585 
R-squared 0.010 0.116   
Country fixed effects No Yes No 
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Notes: City is unity if the individual lives in a high-density area according to Eurostat’s Degree of urbanisation 
(DEGURBA) classification. Tertiary indication is unity if the individual has completed the first stage of tertiary 
education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) or the second stage of tertiary 
education (leading to an advanced research qualification). Column 3 reports the marginal effects evaluated 
at the mean of each variable. Standard errors in parentheses; all specifications include country fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
EU NUTS2 Regions 
Although we have reservations about the use of NUTS2 regions, as discussed in the main text, 
convergence across NUTS2 regions is an important EU policy aim. One important headline indicator 
of disparities, because it determines eligibility for the most important EU regional funds, is whether 
a NUTS2 region has GDP per capita less than 75 percent of the EU average. In the EU15 in 2015, 46 
NUTS2 regions out of 204, home to 19 percent of the population, were 75 percent of the average 
GDP per capita. In the EU28, the corresponding figures were 72 out of 262 and 26 percent of the 
population. For comparison, 6 US states, home to 6 percent of the population, have GDP per capita 
less than 75 percent of the US average.  
In 2015, the coefficient of variation (CV) in GDP per capita was 0.31 for EU15 NUTS2 regions and 0.37 
for EU28 NUTS2 regions.8 As for metros, variation across EU15 and EU28 countries explains around 
half of this variation (43 percent and 51 percent, respectively).9 For the EU 15, regional disparities 
fell in the 1980s, stabilised in the 1990s before falling again from around 2000 to the mid-2000s (see 
figure A6).10 Overall, the coefficient of variation fell from 0.31 in 1980 to 0.26 in 2003. The double-
dip recession of 2009 and 2012 reversed this long-term trend and by 2015 regional disparities were 
almost back to their 1980 levels. For the EU28 we have a much shorter time series. Starting in 2004, 
when the new members joined the EU, the coefficient of variation fell from 0.38 to a low of 0.36 in 
2009 and then remained at similar levels until 2015. 
Figure A6  
Variance coefficient of GDP per capita – NUT2 regions 
                                                          
8 As discussed in the main text, in 2015, aggregating the five London NUTS2 reduces the EU15 coefficient of 
variation by 29 percent from 0.44 to 0.31. For the population weighted version of the coefficient of variation 
the reduction is 18 percent. We therefore aggregate the London NUTS2. 
9 These figures are based on decomposing the squared coefficient of variation. 
10 The figures report the unweighted coefficients of variation. The overall levels and trends for the EU15 and 
EU28 are largely unchanged if we weight by population.  
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Notes: Authors own calculations based on NUTS2 regions as described in the text.  
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